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ABSTRACT

Advocating reform of the history curriculum, this paper builds upon the "paradigmatic" impact of scientific advancement upon social and cultural, as well as intellectual and scientific, communities. Historians are constructing new paradigms of the discipline structure by stressing theory, methodology, and by relating historical knowledge to general knowledge, all pointing to the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to promote good scholarship and analytic history. New perspectives are reflected in historians' works but not in curriculum structure. The profession could incorporate changes, first, by delineating theories of curriculum accepted by history departments, and second, by examining tactics utilized to transform the curriculum, eight of which are: 1) structuring curriculum to reflect a particular theory of history; 2) introducing new methodology courses; 3) providing alternative courses of study; 4) using senior level interdisciplinary seminars; 5) encouraging a particular approach to history through requirements; 6) incorporating area studies courses into the curriculum; 7) using national history at an introductory level; and 8) developing courses with topical and thematic approaches. Historians and educators, if able to harmonize curriculum structures with the new paradigms in historical thinking, could revitalize higher education. (SJM)

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Paper #1

**The Changing Structures of Historical Knowledge and
Undergraduate Curriculum**

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The Changing Structures of Historical Knowledge
and Undergraduate Curriculum

At pivotal moments in scientific development, substantial changes in understanding the universe are signalled by the construction of new paradigms* which allow new precepts.¹ This process was illustrated by Alfred North Whitehead in contrasting the scientific methods of Galileo and Michaelson. Galileo, who dropped two balls of different size and weight from a tower to arrive at certain principles of velocity through observation and common sense explanation, displayed a relatively unsophisticated level of scientific experimentation and theorization; Michaelson, on the other hand, attained a higher level of metaphysical questioning. Interested in transcending the quarrel between vitalists and mechanists, he constructed an experiment designed to test conclusively for the existence of ether in the universe. While observation and common sense explanation had previously allowed metaphysicians a full range of speculation, Michaelson, as a physicist concerned with scientific explanation, understood the function of instrumentation to stand between the theorist and the universe.² Whatever the merits of his findings, which are uncertain, he did clear the way for Einstein's theory of relativity. The Michaelson-Einstein advances were achieved only through new theories, not through common sense explanation.

*By "paradigm" Thomas Kuhn, who recently explored the nature of change in scientific thought, meant a specific scientific achievement involving theory and concepts as well as application. The paradigm is then used as a model for scientific research.

Naturally, not all scientists and certainly not the "man in the street" accepted the new paradigms. Within the scientific community there was a gradual diffusion of knowledge, eventually reflected in college and university curricula. A wide gap between the scientific community and the general public could develop. A nineteenth century hope that scientific rationality would be reflected in the social world has been belied by the "man in the street" who frequently retreats into fundamentalism, avoiding or ignoring changes in the scientific paradigm to maintain intact the social bond. One consequence of this classic miscalculation, an effort to preserve equilibrium at the expense of a higher rationality, is recorded in twentieth century world history. Revolts against modernity have produced newer social and cultural paradigms constructed on authoritarian or totalitarian bases and the manipulation of symbols, myths and images for purposes of social control. These phenomena are all too evident and further amplification is not required here. Scientists of the nineteenth century intended their work to free man; too often science and technology have been used to control him.

These phenomena clearly demonstrate that new paradigms are developed in the social and cultural world, paralleling the process in the scientific. While the development of paradigms in the social or cultural world, however, do parallel those in the "policy sciences," they are not necessarily dependent upon those developments.³ The pattern of change in social or cultural outlooks relates in some way to scientific theory, but also possesses a semi-autonomous existence.

Changes in the structure of knowledge are often, but not always, paradigmatic. The possible patterns according to which ideas (or institutions) change are the following. There may be changing variables

within a process—that is, reordering within a static structure. There may be basic structural change—a rearrangement of institutions, ideas, values, etc., or even the creation of new institutions. Thirdly, there is an intermediate type of change—incremental change which may contain some feature of the two types just mentioned.

Historians are becoming quite conscious of these changes within their thinking. As they, like other disciplinarians, reexamine their field of inquiry, they grow restive over the state of the profession. John Higham, Felix Gilbert and Leonard Krieger collaborated in a study of the profession of history which expressed this restiveness. Although writing separate essays, each writer suggested that the use of history to legitimize the middle classes, celebrate their political triumphs over the aristocracy and to promote civic education seems exhausted. They, through their analysis, directed historians toward making new contributions to human knowledge.⁴ While Higham warned against the pitfalls of more traditional historiography and indicated more fruitful directions of inquiry, a harsher critic of Progressive historians doubted if they ever had had a philosophy of history, contending that they only reflected a mood of social reform.⁵ They were concerned with directing the course of national development rather than with the nature of knowledge itself.

The situation is far from bleak, however, for historians have been rapidly transforming the structure of their discipline through a growing stress on theory and the larger relationship of historical to general knowledge. The appearance of three scholarly journals during the past decade attest to an awareness of the problem: History and Theory,

distinctly interdisciplinary, redirects the attention of the profession toward basic philosophical/methodological considerations; Comparative Studies in Society and History, another interdisciplinary venture, expands the range and direction of historical inquiry; and the Journal of Social History, as a matter of philosophy blurring the line between social history and sociological history, gives institutional legitimacy to what had existed as a subterranean flow in the profession. Historians and philosophers have addressed themselves, moreover, to the structure of historical knowledge with a new verve and critical spirit missing for decades.⁶

Thrust toward reunification of knowledge also comes from the area studies programs. The differences between area studies programs and reconstructed history are increasingly few. In a highly perceptive analysis in the American Quarterly, Gene Wise distinguished between symbolist and progressive modes of thought in historical and social science literature. By "Progressive" Professor Wise intended a framework of Pragmatic and Progressive assumptions and attitudes. By "symbolist", he meant, borrowing from The Philosophy of Literary Form by Kenneth Burke, not the signification of ultimate reality, but the perception of the historical actor which abstracts and interprets "objective" reality; clearly a psychological rather than a metaphysical definition. He examined Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s The Age of Jackson and Lee Benson's The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy to epitomize symbolist or progressive interpretations of history. While Arthur Schlesinger Jr. considers himself a "humanist" and has opposed social science approaches to history, Schlesinger appears to be a Progressive, according to Wise, a man whose "paradigmatic" view stresses sequence, whereas Lee Benson, characterized as a social scientist, stresses a symbolist/humanist

perspective.⁷ Benson clearly more closely approximates an American Studies view of history.

The challenge to traditional modes of historical thought comes from yet other sources. Historians have eroded older conceptions of history through the development of methodology. This enterprise has forced them to codify the results of these incremental advances. Professor Gowan, who previously examined generalizations in the writing of history, has addressed himself explicitly to this concern. His The Structure of Historical Knowledge will be coming from Random House shortly.

These new perspectives -- emphasizing the structure of historical knowledge and the importance of theory and methodology -- challenge both the autonomy of history as a discipline and its claim to studying unique phenomena. Analytic history requires interdisciplinary cooperation. Thomas H. Eliot, for example, commenting upon the essays emerging from a Conference on American Political Party Development at Washington University in 1966, held jointly by political scientists and political historians, believed the two disciplines were not only engaged in a dialogue but that the dialogue was given direction by common concerns.⁸ The stress in these essays was upon structure, process, development and change, not upon unique events. Political historians were still interested in events, but they were much more sophisticated in their understanding of the intersecting of vertical and horizontal causes. Because they were interested in pattern, regularity and trend, they were able to examine events in new ways and as part of an historical process.

The major problem of synthesis has always been a barb in Cleo's side. In an age of specialization and fragmentation the tendency has been to build higher walls around disciplines with the intention of promoting scholarship

with a newer counter-tendency to emphasize interdisciplinary approaches.

Do good fences make good scholars? Sigmund Diamond, raising the question, then appraising the recent scholarship, responded negatively; quite the reverse was true--good fences do not good scholars make. The Namierists easily adjusted to team research; an interdisciplinary seminar on irrational political and mass social movements contributed to the studies by Peter Wolsey on cargo cults, Norman Cohn on medieval millenial movements and Eric Hobsbawm on nineteenth century primitive rebels in Southern Europe; and Thomas Cochran, writing in Social Science Research Council Bulletin 64, called for studies of the family in the socialization process--a call now heeded by members of the profession.⁹

Interdisciplinary activities do, quite clearly, promote good scholarship. Simultaneously, however, they complicate synthesis for historians. Professor Roy Nichols in his Presidential Address to the American Historical Association in 1966 underscored some of the complications and promises for a coming generation of historians. Lamenting the fragmentation of historical study, he preferred the concept of culture as the basis for a new synthesis in history. Calling upon historians to address themselves to larger spans of history and to exercise their imaginations, he urged the greater free play of the historical mind, and, implicitly, the construction of a new paradigm.¹⁰ He recommended a strategy.

Other strategies for the new task of resynthesizing have emerged from probing inquiries into the nature of historical knowledge. Louis Gottschalk, summarizing the conclusions of historians writing on generalization, scaled historical generalization from the compilation of unique data to "cosmic and panoramic" concepts of history.¹¹ David Brion Davis, representing another view of culture, suggested that historians studied three levels of

cultural history that should be converged: the tracing of broad patterns of unity, focusing upon central antinomies within a culture or culture-segment, and the lines of intersection between the development of culture and individual personality.¹² In a very real sense Professor Davis seeks a half-way covenant with the social sciences, as did Richard Hofstadter earlier.¹³ Unlike Davis or Hofstadter, Thomas C. Cochran has been more uncompromising--to the point of being characterized as an anthropological historian--in his advocacy of social science synthesis in history.¹⁴ Paradigms have also been proposed by other disciplinarians. Coming to history from sociology, Neil Smelser even proposed a sociological history.¹⁵

Besides trying to accomodate the sociology of knowledge with the history of ideas, historians have also adopted the strategy of "principled opportunism."¹⁶ Briefly, historians are reevaluating the nature of the discipline. More behaviorally oriented historians have advanced the most systematic efforts pointing towards new paradigms. Accordingly, Robert Berkhofer, accepting a behavioral approach to history, committed himself to codification of "middle range theory", a tactical and limited application of functionalism.¹⁷ Although repelled by closed systems of inquiry, Berkhofer also understands the value of systems analysis.¹⁸

The thrust toward restructuring and resynthesizing comes from many directions and varying philosophical traditions. Any explanation of this thrust would be highly complex. Let it suffice to say that scholars' interest in the enterprise has been enduring. Scholars have, in one instance, attempted to bridge psychology with history or the social sciences. Wilhelm Reich, as a left-wing Freudian, was especially interested in connecting Freudian psychology with Marxian sociology.¹⁹ In another instance, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann looked favorably upon a nexus of Vilfredo Pareto's

general sociology with George Herbert Mead's Mind, Self and Society.²⁰

As an ego psychologist, Eric Erikson has not only prevailed upon historians to write psychoanalytic history but has done so himself, most recently contributing a biography of Ghandi to stand beside his earlier work on

Young Man Luther.²¹ In contradistinction to the ego psychologists, Herbert Marcuse, in the Marxian tradition, has explored the philosophical and sociological implications of Freudian psychology with alternative conclusions.²²

Each of these efforts originate in differing schools of psychology and history. Restatements of former philosophical quarrels are carried into the social sciences.

Lastly, one can refer to art or cultural history. Jacques Barzun advocated a new synthesis through description of the characteristic styles, motifs and patterns of a given period--what might be remembered as *Zeitgeist* except it would be represented in concrete social and cultural forms.²³ From a different point of view, Meyer Schapiro, the reknowned art historian, advocated relating group style to economic, political and ideological conditions. He further believed that such a study awaited a "...unified theory of the processes of social life...."²⁴ Herein lies a major obstacle in the path of historians searching for new paradigms. Must historians, as Professor Schapiro suggests, await a theory of society to construct a theory of politics or art? For Sigmund Diamond and Edward Saveth the answer was no.²⁵ Saveth urged historians to use the nuclear ideas of the social sciences, the categories of a cross-sectional analysis of society. Diamond also urged applied social science methodology. If historians accept this limited or middle range application of theory, they must rely upon hypothesis construction in their studies. As long as they are raising potentially verifiable hypotheses, they rely upon empirical safeguards and move slowly

toward theory construction.²⁶ As an anthropologist examining the concept of social structure concluded, the theoretical construct proved useful even if social structures rather than social structure existed.²⁷ There is a logical, but not always visible, connection between our theories and explanations. Theory is required if the historian is to fulfill his obligation to explain. Values premised in theories invisibly affect our researches.

Almost a decade ago Gabriel Kolko, critiquing the uses of social science by the entrepreneurial historians, warned of the dangers of proceeding on the assumption of a value free social science.²⁸ The historian, as he indicated, must be alert to "free will" and "deterministic" implications in the theories they accept. He must be alert to the structures of opportunity in various socio-historical situations. It is at this point that the nature of theory effects the historian's findings and synthesis. Theory of society differs from sociological theory in that "...sociological theory has to do with detailed problems clearly delimited from each other, with findings that build onto existing knowledge or reject it as the case may be, the theory of society is concerned with the interpretation of the totality of social being." Thus, as Ralf Dahrendorf explains, the function of a theory of society is to prepare the way for the formulation of sociological theory and guard against reification.²⁹ These same observations are applicable to theories as they are developed by the more behavioral social sciences.

Historians, accepting the "middle range theories of sociology," or using cross-sectional analysis of society, the nuclear ideas of the social sciences, do not escape this paradox, even if they ignore it. Philosophers and certain philosophical historians may interest themselves in theory of theory, but practising historians must, minimally, operate above the specific social science theories they may utilize for purposes of hypothesis construction.

Louis Gottschalk referred, in his summary article in Generalizations in the Writing of History, to the field of meta-history. Probably he had in mind a level of theory termed by the sociologist Dahrendorf as para-theory--a middle ground between theory of theory and sociological theory.³⁰ Although terminology may vary (a problem for metalinguistics), scholars do share some common philosophical interests and problems. Thus, both Gottschalk and Dahrendorf seem to be arguing for theory that allows a more critical synthesis of knowledge and allows for the construction of new paradigms.

Since historians are not totally disinterested in social and political issues and since they are aware of the influence of synthesis upon the future, they do, occasionally, engage in politics within the profession. John Higham anticipated certain trends in historical writing as early as 1963 when he pointed to the growth of anti-progressive and negative scholarship.³¹ Professor Higham's premonitions have been proven by events to be partially correct. While critical historians have also been working toward a reinterpretation of the American past,³² others, seeking to mediate politically between conservatives and radicals in the profession, have encouraged the uniting of history from the point of view of the dispossessed.³³ One immediate result has been the frantic search for "black and brown" historians by recruitment committees. In the vernacular the profession will allow them "to do their thing," apparently in the belief they will revitalize historical interpretation. In an almost desperate effort to preserve a social equilibrium in American society historians have added new wings to their professional mansion. In the past, as new ethnic groups rose in social and economic status they entered the profession of history as the healthy yeast of intellectual ferment. The present situation does not completely parallel past experience. As a matter of policy, the profession is moving as rapidly

as possible to expand its ethnic base. As a strategy of social change, it is highly limited. As a strategy for resynthesis, it seems contrived. One may accept the idea of broadening the ethnic base of the profession without accepting the implicit strategy for resynthesizing history from the point of view of the dispossessed. Eugene Genovese, accepting the imperative urgency to broaden the ethnic base of the profession, also perceived the unparalleled opportunity for Black historians to revitalize general history by addressing themselves to broader issues rather than being limited to Black or Afro-American history.³⁴

The search for new moral paradigms directly influences efforts of historians of various political persuasions to reinterpret the past. When John Higham pointed to the growing chaos within historical writing, he attempted to rally the profession to a new moral commitment to offset the effects of "anti-progressive" interpretation. In making this appeal he implicitly or explicitly had some view of the future. Likewise, "New Left" historians attempt to place their interpretive imprint upon the past. With the formation of a Radical Historians Caucus within the American Historical Association the influence of political commitments became quite clear even if the meaning of "radical" history was amorphic. If historians agree that morality is not outside history, there is ample opportunity for rational discourse among historians about the varieties of moral paradigms and their justifications as they relate to the images of man and theories of society held by the historian. Indeed, it is the obligation of the historian to demonstrate the worth of his world view through historical studies.

While historians can and should avail themselves of the methods and definitions of the social sciences, they must be careful not to accept the philosophical presuppositions of these disciplines blindly. Using only

"middle range social science theory" does not free the historian from the larger implications of that theory. He may delay coming to grips with these philosophical difficulties or accept the limited contributions of these disciplines on an interpretive level, but still runs the risk of prematurely closing his options. The same criticisms are applicable to humanistic scholarship.³⁵

There remains a healthy pluralism of concepts and theories because of, not despite, the state of flux. Historians are coming to grips critically with newer modes of thought emerging from the behavioral sciences. Approaching the phenomenon from differing traditions, historians respond with varying remedies. As a consequence, at least three classifications of history seem to be emerging: general history, structural history and comparative history. General history is more traditional and usually consists of analytic narrative. Even when affected by new techniques of inquiry and their implications for analysis, general history is structured around major events, Presidential or Dynastic succession, great wars, great minds, revolutions, etc. (Ideas about social structure, processes, trends or dynamics may be included but will be accommodated to the traditional mode of periodization.) Structural history in its more social science forms stresses social structure, culture (in its anthropological meaning), process and trend. Still interested in events, these historians interpret them from a different perspective, placing them on a social or cultural continuum. Stephen Thernstrom's study of social mobility in 19th century America's Newburyport exemplifies structural history, as do Jackson Turner Main's study of social structure in Revolutionary America and Robert Doherty's study of the socio-logical bases of the Hicksite and Presbyterian Schisms.³⁶ Comparative history has various forms. As in the cases of R. R. Palmer's Age of Democratic

Revolutions or Crane Brinton's Anatomy of a Revolution, it may be used to compare events; in another context it may be used to compare the process of modernization as in the case of Barrington Moore Jr.'s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. It may also be used to study a specific phenomenon, as for example David Brion Davis' Slavery in Western Culture. Comparison may also be made through historical time rather than across geographical space.

Historians devoted to the cause of Clio have with some imagination and energy undertaken a basic reappraisal of the structure of their discipline that will have far reaching effects. Although these changes in perspective are richly reflected in monographs and interpretive histories, they are not so reflected in curriculum structure as a whole or even within new courses provided for the undergraduate student. This failure may be partially explained by the difficulties involved in making institutional changes as opposed to individual innovation. Sadly, however, the problem may be more fundamental; it may be rooted in the historian's priorities. Greater emphasis is placed upon contributions through historical writing than upon the oral tradition of presentation--teaching--which tends to be neglected.

The oral and written traditions may be viewed as two equivalent modes of communicating historical knowledge. As such they should reflect equally changes in the profession's thinking.³⁷ There is an ongoing requisite for changing curriculum structures reinforced by the legitimate demands of undergraduates for more "relevant" education. It is unfortunately true that most colleges or universities have not reviewed their history curriculum structure in more than two decades.

How may the profession incorporate changes in historical thinking into history curriculum? The answer to this question is two-fold. First, the theories of curriculum accepted by history departments must be delineated,

and second, the tactics (dependent in large degree upon theory of curriculum) utilized to transform the curriculum must be located and described.³⁸

At universities with outstanding reputations as research institutions the tendency in curriculum theory is to see the classroom as the extension of the scholar's research--an arena in which to develop ideas later to appear in print. Courses closely correspond to the specific research interest of the scholar. There is little effort on the departments' part to provide a complete range of courses but rather a tendency to be highly selective in their emphases. This represents an ideal toward which many less prestigious history departments may strive, but which, for various reasons is impracticable. The educational mission assigned to public institutions, for example, may prohibit the realization of that ideal.

At the other end of the spectrum of curricular alternatives are those institutions that emphasize instruction over research. More institutions appear in this category than in the former. Depending upon the size and resources available, there is an effort in these departments to be comprehensive in course offerings. While attention is given to curriculum theory and design, the trend towards reform is slow and at times imperceptible.

Between the two poles on this spectrum of curriculum theory lie those history departments with mixed research-instructional commitments. These institutions are curricular conglomerates. In certain instances courses are designed to reflect the research interests of the historian. In other instances they seem to be the broadly defined courses common to most departments with instructional emphasis. Usually there are three kinds of courses reflecting traditional, topical/thematic, and comparative designs.

Last are the institutions that do not consciously refer to curriculum theories at all. Often in small liberal arts or denominational colleges, instructional theory displaces curriculum theory. Whatever structure there may be results from independent study or tutorial programs contracted between professor and student. Success or failure seems to depend purely on laissez-faire mechanisms. For public institutions this latter policy seems least feasible, as educational economics--the expense of operation--prohibits universities engaged in mass education from individualizing curriculum in this way.

Just how do departments examined for purposes of this article relate their curricular structures to the changing structures of historical knowledge? Research institutions, usually graduate training centers, seem to have the greatest flexibility. Where there is a direct relationship between scholarship and teaching, incorporation of advances in historical scholarship into curriculum is dependent only upon the persistence of the individual scholar and the tolerance of his colleagues. The major obstacles to the incorporation of new knowledge into curriculum are found in public institutions where teaching functions are defined as primary. Historians must contend not only with habits of perception conditioned by institutional existence, but also with bureaucracy in large and giant educational enterprises.

The afore-mentioned analysis of history curriculum uncovers eight discernible tactics for reconstruction or revitalizing history education. In abbreviated form the tactics are as follows:

1. A total structuring of the undergraduate curriculum to reflect a particular theory of history. This might be accomplished by using a unifying concept such as civilization, culture, society or modernization.
2. The introduction of new methodology courses into the requirements for

the major. This device might very well be transitional in function since changes in methodology will eventually force changes in the concept of history.

3. Providing alternative courses of study within the major (i.e., a student might earn a degree in "American culture" rather than in American history). The culture concept as derived from anthropology seems to be the most common alternative given. This technique seems, at least partially, to close the gap between history and area studies programs.

4. The use of interdisciplinary seminars on the senior level. Unlike courses in methodology at most institutions this emphasis on interdisciplinary inquiry provides an opportunity for synthesis or codification.

5. The use of requirements to encourage a particular approach to the study of history. Even if traditional courses are offered, the manipulation of requirements makes it possible to give a comparative focus to study by demanding knowledge of two societies and mandating a senior examination to give evidence that the student has achieved this understanding. The interdisciplinary seminar may be used to good advantage under these circumstances.

6. The incorporation of courses developed in area studies programs into the history curriculum. This is done on a limited and selected basis and is in harmony with the trend toward the development of courses around philosophical or cultural themes.

7. An elimination of traditional survey courses in American history and Western or World Civilization and the use of national history on the introductory level with elective options. When this is accomplished, the upper division history program is reconstituted.

8. The development of courses in topical and thematic approaches with the

abandonment of political synthesis. In this case political history is given as one of several topics. Another alternative derives from the cross-sectional analysis of society; i.e. demography, social structure, social mobility, class structure and social values.

Happily, as may be inferred from the variety of tactics described, historians are concerned about teaching and have been investing their talents in curriculum innovations. At an historical moment when scholars have become accustomed to dodging brickbats, it is gratifying to discover historians vitally receptive to curriculum reforms. There is every reason for them to keep their efforts clearly visible. As States become more deeply mired in their fiscal crises and students become more vocal in their struggle for participation in university development, it is probable that educational reform may be used against faculty, particularly in state institutions. The valid common interest of students and faculty in quality education can be mobilized to give new relevance to higher education. But if, on the other hand, faculties refuse to participate with students or take into account student concerns for reform, they may allow the issue to become a political game open to predatory political animals.

Reforms in university governance, participation of students in decision-making processes, student evaluations of teaching performance and the formation of "experimental colleges" may, in some ways, contribute to a revitalized university community, but the most urgent task for the scholar is to lead in curriculum reform. It is especially urgent that scholars impress upon administrators the primary importance of curriculum development as the foundation for meaningful and enduring educational reform. To do less would be to abrogate responsibility for providing students with intellectual leadership.

Today historians and educators have an unparalleled opportunity to exercise this leadership. If, through the rethinking of educational priorities and a reexamination of curriculum, they are able to harmonize curriculum structures with the new paradigms in historical thinking they will be laying a foundation stone for a revitalized higher education. Since historians play a synthesizing role as men of knowledge, reform of history curriculum can lead to the attainment of a new meaningfulness in education.

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NOTES

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35. Dahrendorf, Essays, p. vii.
36. Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), and Robert W. Doherty, The Hicksite Separation: A Sociological Analysis of Religious Schism in Early Nineteenth Century America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers U. Press, 1967).
37. George A. Beauchamp, Curriculum Theory (Wilmette, Illinois: The Kagg Press, 1968). pp. 6-8.
38. There were two surveys made. Last year I analyzed the structure of American history curricula at ten major universities, the eighteen colleges and universities used by the California State Colleges for purposes of pay scale comparison and the catalogues immediately available within our history department. This year the department curriculum committee has expanded the project into other fields of history. To date we have completed an analysis of several liberal arts colleges and universities.
Colleges: Bard, Bryn Mawr, Goddard, Haverford, Lawrence (U.), Occidental, Reed, Sarah Lawrence, Wesleyan (U.)
Universities: U. of California - Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Hartford, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, Pittsburgh, Princeton, Stanford, Wisconsin, Yale